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Abstract  
 
This paper develops an analysis of creativity that is informed by the social identity 
approach. Two studies are reported which support this analysis.  Study 1 (N = 73) 
manipulated social identity salience and the content of group norms. The group norm was 
either conservative (i.e., promoted no change) or progressive (i.e., promoted change). When 
social identity was salient and the group norm was conservative a non-novel proposal was 
perceived to be more creative.  Study 2 (N = 63) manipulated social norms and personal 
relevance. Results showed that while social norms influenced perceptions of creativity, 
personal relevance influenced positivity but not perceptions of creativity.  These findings 
support the idea that perceptions of creativity are grounded in the normative content of group 
membership and self-categorization processes.  
 
Key words  
Creativity, identification, social identity, group norms, leadership. 
 3
Creativity: A social identity perspective 
The central research question addressed in this paper is “When is creativity perceived 
or recognized?” As we elaborate below, this question is deceptively simple. The traditional 
answer to the question is that any product is creative as a result of its intrinsic properties, for 
example, its novelty (Barron, 1955). But if creativity is something intrinsic to the creator or 
the product, why do some artists (like Van Gogh) or politicians (like Martin Luther King) 
receive only broad recognition for the creativity of their work and ideas after their life has 
ended? Why did it take so long until the “time had come” for their innovation to be 
appreciated? Later approaches to creativity pointed out that perceptions of creativity depend 
not just on intrinsic properties, but also on features of the context and the perceiver 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1998). Indeed, we have no other way of knowing the intrinsic properties 
of an object other than through our subjective perceptions (e.g., Amabile, 1996). Thus, in the 
extreme, it can be claimed that an idea or object is not creative until it is perceived as such. 
For this reason, it appears that research should focus not simply on identifying creative 
people or creative creations, but also, and perhaps more so, on the social processes (e.g., of 
judgement and evaluation) involved in recognizing them as creative. Doing so would give the 
study of creativity a social psychological dimension. Moreover, the benefits of such an 
approach would not be theoretical alone as there are practical benefits in terms of 
understanding and predicting when and why innovations are adopted (Rogers, 1995). 
A more subjective approach to creativity implies that it should be studied within a 
given social system. Within such a system, the created object and the creator are just two of 
many elements that can be considered. Perhaps as a result of the complexities that this 
introduces, a systematic analysis of the factors that might influence the recognition of 
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creativity has so far been theoretically and empirically limited. The present paper takes a first 
step towards developing such a systematic account, and explores the factors that impact on 
the perception of creativity in intragroup settings. Our approach to the question is informed 
by the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987). 
Defining creativity 
In the field of psychology, there has been a lot of disagreement and discontent over 
the definition and assessment of creativity (Amabile, 1996). One of the key problems is that 
traditional conceptual definitions of creativity are difficult to use for empirical research 
(Amabile, 1996). The most commonly accepted conceptual definition of creativity revolves 
around the intrinsic properties of novelty (i.e., originality) and appropriateness (i.e., utility in 
a particular context; e.g., Barron, 1955; Bruner, 1962; Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1967; Stein, 
1974). Conceptual definitions, like this one, have been the basis for theoretical formulations 
of creativity (Amabile, 1983) and they are considered intuitive and reasonable. However, a 
challenge to these approaches is that novelty and appropriateness are not static properties of 
an object, but rather these depend on the evaluative context and on the perceiver. For 
example, something novel in London may be old hat in New York, and something 
appropriate in New York may be considered shocking in London. More formally, the 
conceptual definition of creativity as based on novelty and appropriateness presents a 
“criterion problem” because it is not ready to be translated into useful assessment criteria 
(Amabile, 1982). For the purposes of empirical research, therefore, one has to abandon the 
hope of finding the “ultimate” objective criteria for creativity, in favour of a definition that 
relies on inter-subjective criteria (Amabile, 1983, p. 359). Ultimately, it has been argued that 
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a product or response is creative when relevant judges independently agree that it is so 
(Amabile, 1982). In other words, researchers such as Amabile (1983) have argued that 
creativity depends upon subjective evaluations of the product’s creativeness, which may be 
partially based on its perceived novelty and/or appropriateness. 
In the same vein, Csikszentmihalyi (1998) has argued that definitions of creativity 
should recognise the importance of perceivers, and the wider group context within which 
their evaluations take place. In Csikszentmihalyi’s words, “what we call creativity is a 
phenomenon that is constructed through an interaction between the producer and 
audience … creativity is not the product of single individuals but of social systems 
making judgments about individuals’ products” (1998, p. 41, emphasis added). 
According to this observation, what is fundamental to understanding creativity and its 
potential impact is its endorsement and acceptance (and hence potential adoption) within 
a wider community of people. These are bold claims. Nonetheless, in real life settings, 
the evaluations made by relevant perceivers (so-called gatekeepers; Csikszentmihalyi, 
1994; Lewin, 1956; and regulators; Stein, 2003) is what determines what is implemented 
and what gets through to the public. In light of this argument, the evaluative process 
needs to be explored in order to fully understand when an outcome is considered creative. 
Although Csikszentmihalyi’s (1998) approach emphasizes the importance of 
collective judgements made in social systems as a whole, his own work in fact tends to 
focus largely on the influence of individual factors (e.g., past experience) on individual 
judgements of creativity. While we agree that personal factors could potentially explain 
how individuals in isolation evaluate a given creation, we feel that such analysis disguises 
the reality that such evaluations are not made in a social vacuum. In real life settings the 
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relevance of relational factors becomes crucial. One of these relational factors to 
perceptions of creativity is group membership (i.e., the group to which perceivers and 
creators belong). For example, it has been argued that in some organizations, insiders can 
be quite antagonistic and reject outsiders’ contributions by displaying what is referred to 
as an “NIH” attitude: if it is “not invented here”, it is no good (Stein, 2003, p. 387). In a 
similar vein, but in artistic domains, it has been noted that people often display 
ethnocentric bias when judging other people's creations (Simonton, 1984). That is, they 
consider the creations of members of their group to be better than creations of members 
of other groups. This research on group-related factors (Simonton, 1984; Stein 2003) 
offers some very interesting and novel pointers towards the processes that play a role in 
shaping perceptions of creativity. We believe that the social identity perspective (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) offers a 
comprehensive framework within which such group-related factors (e.g., group 
membership) can be understood as contributing to the perception of creativity.  
Social identity and creativity 
The central premise of the social identity perspective (encompassing social identity 
theory, SIT, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; and self-categorization theory, SCT, Turner, et al., 1987) 
is that individuals derive aspects of their identity from their membership of particular social 
groups. These internalized group characteristics are called social identities. Social identity 
can be contrasted from personal identity (Turner, 1982), which comprises aspects of the self 
that are not derived from group memberships, but which define the individual as an 
idiosyncratic person, different from other individuals. Thus, a woman called Mary may see 
sometimes see herself as 'Mary', distinct from others individuals, or as a ‘woman’, similar to 
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other women and different from men. When she interacts with a man (e.g., James), she may 
self-categorize as an individual person (i.e., her personal identity is salient), thereby defining 
herself and James in terms of idiosyncratic characteristics, and dealing with him as an 
individual. However, in other contexts, Mary and James can self-categorize themselves in 
terms of divergent group memberships (e.g., as representatives of two groups, men and 
women).  
Self-categorization as a group member has several consequences that are relevant to 
the question of how creativity is recognized. In the first instance, self-categorization theory 
argues that social identity and the recognition of shared group membership are critical 
determinants of people’s willingness to engage with others (Turner, 1991). The 
straightforward implication is that if a product is perceived to be associated with an ingroup 
or its creator is perceived to be an ingroup member, it is more likely to be approached and 
regarded favourably than it is when it comes from an outgroup. Research outlined above 
(Simonton, 1984; Stein, 2003) confirms that this is a phenomenon that occurs in real life 
settings. We believe that this "creative ingroup bias", is a critical and pervasive phenomenon 
that determines people's responses to creations and attempted innovations. In previous 
studies, we have provided an experimental demonstration of such an ingroup bias and of the 
way that it affects creativity judgements outside the artistic and organizational domains 
(Adarves-Yorno, 2005). These studies demonstrated that the same ideas (and creations) are 
considered to be more creative when they are said to originate from an ingroup source, than 
when the source is said to be an outgroup member. This confirms results of prior non-
experimental work (Simonton, 1984; Stein, 2003), but controlling for the actual product 
being evaluated.  
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An extension of this basic idea is that the nature of a person’s relationship to their 
group should also influence such perceptions. Put slightly differently, self-categorization 
theory states that group members expect to have shared perceptions and understandings of 
those issues that are relevant to group membership (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, in press; 
Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989). In other words, self-categorization creates an 
anticipation among group members that their perceptions on group-relevant dimensions will 
be similar, and that they will converge when such perceptions are different (see also Asch, 
1951, p. 484). This process has far-reaching consequences because these expectations often 
assume normative properties, regulating group members’ actions and perceptions. This may 
help to explain, for example, why men and women typically wear different clothes, perform 
different roles, and have a different perspective on certain issues. Moreover, the fact that 
social identities are central to a person’s sense of social selfhood can also explain why 
gendered norms of this form are willingly embraced by the members of each group and do 
not need to be imposed coercively. 
Such arguments have a number of direct implications for the analysis of creativity. In 
the first instance, the nature of a person’s relationship to their group should influence 
perceptions of creativity. Identification is an important variable to analyze because it is 
closely associated with higher commitment to the group and greater involvement in its efforts 
and products (Ellemers, de Gilder, & Haslam, 2005; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 
1999; Haslam, 2001). In the same way that the strength of a child’s identification with a 
parent shapes his or her behaviour, so identification with a social group determines the 
degree to which the individual is influenced by social identity (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 
1997; Turner, 1999). 
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Creativity research indeed has confirmed that there is a relationship between 
identification and people's reactions to innovation. Identification with the developer of the 
product, and involvement in the process of product development, have both been shown to be 
factors that influence people’s responses to organizational innovation (King, 2003). 
Consistent with the above findings, we expected that social identification would determine 
the extent to which people recognize a specific ingroup product as creative, with stronger 
identification being associated with higher perceptions of creativity. To initially examine this 
suggestion we (see Adarves-Yorno, 2005) asked participants to (a) complete a three-item 
identification measure (e.g., "I identify with other students of Exeter University", α = .80) 
and (b) evaluate five ideas proposed by a potential student representative (α = .90). 
Consistent with predictions, regression analysis revealed that identification was a good 
predictor of perceptions of creativity, β = .22, t (157) = 2.85, p = .005. Thus, results of this 
study suggest that identification is an important variable when making intragroup judgments 
about creativity.  
So far, research has established the existence of a creative ingroup bias, and has 
demonstrated that the perceived creativity of an ingrouper's creation is also related to the 
strenght of identification with the group. However, these studies have not demonstrated a 
direct implication of social identity processes in the assessment of creativity. That is partially 
because identification is not the critical factor that determines whether groups exert influence 
over their members. According to SCT, the critical factor here is social identity salience. 
Salience is a product of a given identity’s accessibility and fit (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner, 
& Haslam, 1991). Although salience is certainly related to identification (see, e.g., Haslam, 
Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003), an experimental demonstration of the impact of social identity 
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would be more compelling if salience could be directly manipulated. This would also address 
the issue of causality that always plagues studies in which identification can only be 
measured (Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002).  
Purpose of the current research 
One of the key goals of the present research is to manipulate salience directly 
(thereby speaking to the self-categorization processes underlying creativity perceptions). As 
mentioned, social identity salience makes it more likely that people will be responsive to 
social influences from the group, but the precise direction and form of this influence is 
channelled by the content of social identity and group norms. Most social contexts will 
provide clear group norms that serve to dictate the forms of creativity that are acceptable and 
unacceptable (for illustrative case studies, see Howe, 2000). In line with this idea, Amabile 
(1996) noted that the perception of creativity depends on normative criteria. It is largely on 
the basis of specific norms that we decide, for example, whether someone’s clothing is 
normal, fashionable, original or just plain weird. To ascertain the influence of this norm on 
group processes, a strong test of the hypothesis requires one to manipulate its content (see, 
e.g., Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001). In line with this reasoning, Study 1 seeks to 
orthogonally manipulate both norms and salience. 
We expect that when social identity is salient, a product that is consistent with a given 
group norm is more likely to be perceived as creative than a product that is inconsistent with 
this norm. This is likely to be the case even when the group norm encourages one to be 
essentially uncreative as is the case in groups that expect their members to maintain the status 
quo. Study 1 tests the proposal that when a group norm is conservative (i.e., when it 
promotes no change), ideas that are consistent with this norm could be seen as creative, 
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depending on the salience of group identity. In other words, the study tests the counter-
intuitive suggestion that, when social identity has been made salient, a non-novel product 
will be seen as more creative than a novel one. Study 2 aims to replicate the effect of a group 
norm on perceptions of creativity (using different ideas and norms) and also aims to show 
that perceptions of creativity, although related to positive evaluations, are partly determined 
by different underlying processes.  
Study 1  
The aim of this study was to analyse the impact of group norms and salience on the 
perception of a non-novel idea. The salience manipulation focused on participants’ personal 
identity versus their social identity as an Exeter University student. Orthogonal to that, the 
content of the group norm was manipulated by portraying Exeter students as either 
conservative (i.e., willing to keep things as they are) or progressive (i.e., willing to make 
changes). 
The participants were asked to evaluate a non-novel proposal (i.e., one that promoted 
no change). In order to verify that this proposal was indeed non-novel, a pilot study (n= 21) 
was conducted. The novelty of the proposal was assessed on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘very much’ (7). The mid-point (4) of the scale was identified as 
“neutral”. Results showed that evaluation of the proposal was significantly lower than the 
mid-point (M = 3.00, SD = 1.37) t (20) = 3.32, p = .003. This indicates that the proposal was 
perceived to be non-novel. 
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to collect information from 
students about issues that affected them and that this was the second study in an ongoing 
project examining the "opinions of students at the University of Exeter". After the identity 
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salience and group norm manipulations, participants were presented with a conservative idea 
(i.e., to keep things as they are) proposed by a conservative candidate (i.e., who endorsed no 
change). In this study participants not only evaluated the creativeness of the candidate’s idea 
but also they evaluated his leadership qualities.  
In line with the arguments above, it was predicted (H1) that participants would 
perceive the conservative idea to be more creative when their social identity was made salient 
and the content of the group norm was congruent with the content of this idea (i.e., 
conservative). When personal identity was salient the content of the group norm was 
expected to have no effect on perceptions of creativity, and hence the conservative idea 
should not be perceived as more creative.  
In addition to perceptions of creativity, we were also interested in knowing how the 
creator himself was evaluated. In the present context, the evaluator was a potential 
representative (i.e., leader), thus we explored how participants evaluated his leadership 
abilities. Previous research has shown that in the early phases of their leadership, leaders 
have to build up credibility among followers (Hollander, 1958) and that one way of doing 
this is by conforming to ingroup norms (Merei, 1949). This study tested whether factors 
which shape judgments of an idea’s creativity were also implicated in judgments of the 
person who proposes the idea — in particular, in judgments of the creator’s leadership 
qualities. Based on this argument and in line with the hypotheses predicted above, it was 
expected (H2) that participants whose social identity was salient would evaluate the 
conservative candidate as a superior leader when he embodies ingroup norms (i.e., when 
norms are conservative). When personal identity was salient, it was expected that participants 
would not evaluate the conservative candidate as a superior leader when he embodies 
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ingroup norms.  
Method 
Design and Participants 
Identity salience (group identity vs. personal identity) and group norm (conservative vs. 
progressive) were manipulated in a 2 X 2 between-participants factorial design. Participants 
were randomly allocated to conditions. Seventy-three students at the University of Exeter 
participated in this experiment and received course credit for their participation. Stimulus 
materials were presented via computers, and participation took place on-line. 
Procedure 
The experiment was presented as the second study in an ongoing project examining 
the ‘opinions of students at the University of Exeter’. Participants were told that the purpose 
of the study was to collect information from students about issues that affected them. 
Specifically, they were asked to give their opinion about a student candidate for the Guild 
Council Presidency and his ideas. First, identity salience was manipulated. Subsequently, the 
content of group norms was manipulated by providing participants with feedback about 
ostensible conclusions of a previous year’s survey. After these manipulations, participants 
were asked to rate the creativity of the candidate’s proposal and to assess his leadership 
qualities.  
Independent variables 
Identity salience was manipulated by means of the “three things” procedure 
developed by Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds & Turner (1999). Participants were asked to list 
three things that distinguished themselves as unique idiosyncratic individuals (e.g., ‘List up 
to three things that you like to do during the day’) or three things which they had in common 
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with others in their group (e.g., ‘List up to three things that you and most other students of 
the University of Exeter like to do’). 
Group norms, either conservative or progressive, were manipulated by providing 
(false) feedback about the opinions and values of University of Exeter students. This 
feedback was provided in the form of a fictitious research report which was supposedly 
written on the basis of research conducted in the previous year. Specifically, participants 
were led to believe that a survey had previously been conducted which asked, “What do 
students like most about the University of Exeter?” (N = 526). There was never any explicit 
feedback about group norms, but the results of the survey nevertheless presented a relatively 
unambiguous picture about the shared values of Exeter students. To wit, the report listed the 
“top ten things that more than 71% of students like best”. In the conservative condition the 
ten things listed were all conservative attributes of the University such as “Exeter is one of 
the Universities that still maintains the three-term system”. The report then concluded by 
emphasizing the general theme across these 10 best liked things: “In sum, what Exeter 
students like most are the conservative aspects of the university”. In the progressive 
condition, the list consisted of things such as ‘Exeter University is open to change”. This list 
concluded with the observation “In sum, what Exeter students like most are the progressive 
aspects of the University”. In order to give the cover story more credibility, participants were 
also asked if they themselves had participated in this earlier survey.  
A manipulation check consisted of three questions. Participants were asked to give 
their opinion after reading three randomly selected statements from the "top ten things that 
more than 71% of students like best". For example, one of the statements randomly selected 
in the conservative condition was “The University has proved that old tried and tested 
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systems are more effective than new systems”. Students were asked to read those statements 
and state the extent to which they thought the average University of Exeter student would be 
in favour or against making changes to the University. In the conservative norm condition, 
statements revolved around willingness to keep things as they are while in the progressive 
norm condition, those statements revolved around willingness to make changes. These items 
were scored on 7-point Likert scales ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very much” (7) with 
higher scores indicating more perceived willingness to make changes. The three items of the 
manipulation check were aggregated creating one scale (α = .75). 
Dependent variables 
After the manipulation of the group norm, students were presented with a proposal 
from a candidate for the presidency of the Guild Council. The Guild Council is an actual 
organization that represents all student’ societies at the University of Exeter. The candidate’s 
argument was conservative: ‘I believe the university should keep on doing what it has been 
doing over the past years’ and his key policy proposal was also conservative: ‘To maintain 
old buildings and the campus’. His proposal was rated on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from 
“not at all creative” (1) to “very creative indeed” (7).  
The candidate’s leadership qualities were measured using three dimensions of a 
transformational leadership scale ("shows genuine concern", "is accessible and 
approachable", and "encourages critical thinking", α = .84, see Alban-Metcalfe & Alimo-
Metcalfe, 2000). Participants were asked to what extent the conservative candidate had each 
of these leadership attributes. The three measures were aggregated. Again, all items were 
rated on 7-point Likert scales ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very much” (7).   
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Results 
Manipulation check 
We conducted 2 (identity salience) X 2 (group norm) analyses of variance. On the 
group norm check, there was a main effect of group norm suggesting that the manipulation of 
group norm was successful. Participants considered students to be less willing to make 
changes when the norm was conservative (M = 3.27, SD = 1.18) than when the group norm 
was progressive (M = 4.51, SD = 1.03), F (1,69) = 20.68, p < .001, η2 = .23. Results showed 
no main effect of identity salience (p = .77) and the interaction between identity salience and 
group norm was non-significant (p = .23).  
Perceptions of creativity 
Consistent with H1, there was a significant interaction between identity salience and 
group norm, F (1,69) = 5.36, p = .023, η2 = .072. In order to decompose this interaction, we 
analysed simple main effects of group norm for each salience condition. As predicted, 
participants whose social identity was salient considered a conservative idea to be more 
creative when the group norm was conservative (M = 4.76, SD = 1.56) than when the group 
norm was progressive (M = 3.60, SD = 1.68), F (1, 69) = 5.92, p = .057, η2 = .051. Also as 
predicted, when personal identity was salient, the group norm had no effect on participants’ 
perceptions. Participants whose personal identity was salient did not consider the 
conservative idea to be more creative when the group norm was conservative (M = 3.40, SD 
= 1.85) than when the group norm was progressive (M = 4.10, SD = 1.67), F (1, 69) = 1.75, 
p = 1.95. There was neither a main effect of identity salience (p = .28), nor a main effect of 
group norm on the perception of creativity (p = .56).  
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Leadership 
Consistent with H2, there was an interaction between identity salience and group 
norm, F (1,69) = 7.23, p = .009, η2 = .095. Relevant means are presented in Figure 2. In order 
to decompose the interaction, we again analysed simple main effects of the group norm. 
Results were consistent with predictions: when social identity was salient, participants in the 
conservative condition considered the conservative candidate to have more of the qualities 
required of a transformational leader (M = 4.45, SD = 1.26) than in the progressive group 
norm condition (M = 3.75, SD = 0.68), F (1,69) = 3.89, p =.054, η2 = .053. Unexpectedly, 
when personal identity was salient the opposite pattern could be seen. Although it was only a 
marginal effect, participants in the conservative norm condition evaluated the leader 
somewhat less positively (M = 3.58, SD = 1.07) than those in the progressive norm condition 
(M = 4.15, SD = 0.86), F (1,69) = 3.46, p = .070, η2 = .047. There were no main effects on 
participants’ evaluations of the candidate’s leadership (identity salience p = .32, group norm 
p = .80).  
The correlations coefficient between perception of creativity and evaluation of the 
leader indicated that these two dependent variables were moderately associated r = .60, p < 
001. However, there was no indication from analyses of mediation that the effects on 
leadership mediated the effects on perceptions or vice versa. 
Discussion 
The results of the study suggest that an idea which appears to be not particularly 
innovative on its own can nevertheless be perceived to be more creative and desirable under 
specific social circumstances. The present study showed that such an idea was perceived 
most creative when judged by group members whose social identity was made salient in the 
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context of group norms that were congruent with the idea being evaluated (i.e., when both the 
idea and the norm were conservative). 
In addition, the present study also showed a similar finding for the evaluation of the 
creator. He was perceived more positively (i.e., as having more leadership qualities) when he 
embodied the group’s norm, and when the social identity of participants was salient. When 
personal identity was salient, however, there was some indication (although it was only 
marginally significant) that the creator was endorsed more when he deviated from the norm. 
This pattern is consistent with findings of previous research (Postmes, Spears, Sakhel & de 
Groot, 2001) suggesting that those whose social identity is salient display an “assimilative 
tendency” towards group norms, whereas those whose personal identity is salient can 
sometimes display a “contrastive tendency” (a finding that is consistent with suggestions that 
personal identity is constituted by seeking intra-group differentiation; see Turner, Reynolds, 
Haslam, & Veenstra, in press). 
Although leadership was not the central focus of this research, the findings are 
intriguing — especially because they confirm that under certain conditions a person who 
proposes a rather non-novel idea can be perceived as a transformational leader (i.e., a leader 
who is seen as well placed to make organizational changes). These findings are consistent 
with social identity perspectives on leadership (e.g., Duck & Fielding, 1999; Haslam & 
Platow, 2001a, 2001b; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001) but also extend these by providing 
direct evidence — to our knowledge for the first time — that leadership judgments are 
structured by group norms and social identity salience.  
 There are two shortcomings of this research. One is that the norm was manipulated in 
a rather overt way. This could have triggered certain demand issues. Although a 
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straightforward demand could not explain the interaction pattern that we found, it is 
nonetheless preferable to use more subtle manipulations of group norms to rule out the 
possibility that such issues of demand played a role. Furthermore, critics could argue that 
perceptions of creativity are no different to other forms of positive evaluation, and that these 
results are in effect simply a reflection of ingroup bias. Indeed, we believe that perceptions of 
creativity are likely to be strongly related to other positive evaluations. However, we argue 
that there is a subtle but important difference between the two. Both shortcomings were 
addressed in Study 2. 
Study 2 
 In this study, social identity salience was kept constant throughout. Two factors were 
manipulated: the social norms of the superordinate category, and personal relevance (i.e., the 
extent to which proposals were relevant to participants). As in Study 1 the social norm was 
manipulated to be either congruent or incongruent with the ideas suggested. Personal 
relevance was manipulated to be either relevant or irrelevant with the proposal. We reasoned 
that creativity judgments are effectively a matter of social value and would be strongly 
anchored in group norms (see Study 1). However, the assessment of positivity would be more 
strongly determined by personal relevance1. There is personal relevance when ideas are 
appealing to and/or relevant for someone. Generally, we would expect that when ideas are 
relevant for someone, then he or she will evaluate those ideas more positively but not 
necessarily more creative.  
 In this study, participants evaluated proposals to introduce new high-tech innovations 
in a University. The personal (and subgroup) relevance of these proposals was varied by 
selecting participants from different schools. Here it was assumed that the proposals would 
 20
be more appealing to, and relevant for, science students than for humanities students. The 
norm manipulation in this study was more subtle than that of Study 1. In this study, students 
were asked to respond to a set of statements which encouraged them to construe university 
students as either pro-technology or pro-culture. Thus, the norm was either congruent with 
the proposal (i.e., pro-technology) or incongruent (i.e., in favour of cultural activities, or pro-
culture for short). Social identity as university student was made salient for all participants.  
 To explore whether group norm and personal relevance help us to disentangle the 
underlying processes driving perceptions of creativity from positive evaluations, participants 
rated the ideas not only on the dimension of creativity (creative and innovative) but also on 
more generic dimensions of positivity (good and appropriate). There was one further 
difference from Study 1: leadership measures were not included in this study. 
In line with results of Study 1, it was predicted (H1) that participants would 
perceive high-tech ideas to be more creative when the content of the group norm was 
congruent with the content of the idea (i.e., pro-technology). In relation to personal 
relevance, it was predicted (H2) that personal relevance would impact on the positive 
evaluation of ideas, so that high-tech ideas will be evaluated more positively by science 
students (high relevance) than by humanities student (low relevance).  
Method 
Design and Participants 
In a 2 (personal relevance: high [science students] vs. low [humanities students]) X 2 
(group norm: pro-culture vs. pro-technology) between-subjects design, participants evaluated 
ideas related to high-tech innovations. The participants' social identity as a university student 
was made salient for all participants. Participants of each school were randomly allocated to 
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conditions. Sixty-three undergraduate students at the University of Exeter with ages ranging 
from 18 to 27 (M = 19) participated in this study. 
Procedure  
The procedure was similar to Study 1. The experiment was presented as the second 
study in an ongoing project examining the ‘opinions of students at the University of Exeter’. 
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to collect information from students 
about issues that affected them. Specifically, they were asked to give their opinion about the 
proposal of a potential student representative. First, student identity was made salient (using 
the procedure presented in Study 1). Subsequently, the content of group norms was 
manipulated. After this, participants were asked to rate the creativity and positivity of the 
candidate’s ideas.  
Independent variables  
Personal relevance was manipulated simply by selecting participants from science 
versus humanities disciplines. Group norms were subsequently manipulated by providing 
participants with conclusions from a fictitious research report, which was supposedly written 
on the basis of research conducted in the previous year about “students’ opinions”. Rather 
than explicitly informing participants about what the majority of students thought, we asked 
them to indicate their own personal opinions and attitudes towards the conclusions of the 
research report. Thus, the focus ostensibly was on them rather than on the opinions of their 
peers. Participants were asked to tick those conclusions they agreed with. Participants in the 
pro-culture condition were exposed to five general conclusions that were designed to lead 
them to think that students were in favour of cultural activities (e.g., they want more culture, 
music, and art at the university). Participants in the high-tech condition were exposed to five 
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conclusions which suggested that students were pro-technology (e.g., they want more online 
access). In order to avoid any demand characteristics, there was never any explicit feedback 
about group norms, but on the basis of prior research we assumed that participants would 
spontaneously infer what the underlying norm was (see Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997, for 
a similar procedure).  
A manipulation check of personal relevance consisted of one question assessing the 
importance of technology over culture: ‘I think that technology is more important than 
culture’. This item was scored on 7-point Likert scales ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very 
much” (7) with higher scores indicating more agreement with the statement.  
Dependent variables 
After the manipulations, students were presented with a proposal from a potential 
student representative. The proposal was to promote high-tech innovations at the university. 
There were three concrete elements to this: to have “Video link lectures”, “Access to notes 
from lectures in audio format” and an “Internet café with fast and efficient computers and the 
latest technology”. Participants evaluated these ideas on two dimensions: positivity and 
creativity. Both evaluations were made on 7-point semantic differentials, anchored with –3 
for the negative and +3 for the positive evaluation. Positivity was evaluated with the 
differentials "bad" vs. "good" and “inappropriate” vs. “appropriate” (r = .90). Creativity was 
measured with “not creative” vs. “creative” and “not innovative” vs. "innovative" (r = .86).  
Results 
Manipulation check 
All analyses were conducted by means of 2 (personal relevance) X 2 (group norm) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Analysis of the personal relevance check revealed a 
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significant main effect for personal relevance, F (1, 59) = 4.59, p = .036, η2 = .072 . Science 
students (high relevance, M = 3.78, SD = 1.09) considered technology more important that 
humanities students (low relevance , M = 2.42, SD = 1.39).  
Perceptions of creativity 
Consistent with H1, there was a main effect of group norm, F (1, 53) = 4.45, p = .04 
η2 = .078. Participants in the pro-technology norm condition considered high-tech ideas to be 
more creative (M = 1.43, SD = 1.17), than participants in the cultural norm condition (M = 
.61, SD = 1.29). Results also showed neither a main effect of personal relevance (p = .161) 
nor an interaction effect (p = .82) on perceptions of creativity.  
Positive evaluation of ideas 
Consistent with H2, there was a marginally significant effect of personal relevance on 
the positive evaluation of ideas F (1,53) = 5.89, p = .07, η2 = .06. Students from science 
schools evaluated high-tech ideas more positively (M = 1.60, SD = .96) than those from 
humanities schools (M = .85, SD = 1.52). Results also showed neither a main effect of group 
norm (p = .20) nor an interaction effect (p = .68) on positive evaluation.  
Correlational analysis showed that generic positive evaluation and perception of 
creativity were highly correlated, r = .86, p < .001. This is congruent with the idea that 
perception of creativity is another form of positive evaluation. However, as shown above, 
consistent with predictions, both dependent variables were influenced by different IVs.  
Discussion 
Results confirmed our hypothesis that although positive evaluations were highly 
correlated with perceptions of creativity, they were determined by different underlying 
processes. Group norms influenced the perception of creativity (H1) but did not affect 
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generic positive evaluation. On the other hand, there was some indication that personal 
relevance determined generic positive evaluations (H2) but not did not affect perceptions of 
creativity to the same extent. These results confirm that the perception of creativity is subtly 
different from positivity, and is partially grounded in different factors, with creativity being 
more closely linked to the standards of the relevant social group. 
More importantly, however, the results replicated the findings of Study 1, and 
confirmed its theoretical assumptions. Participants (whose social identity was made salient 
throughout) considered ideas that were congruent with the superordinate group norm to be 
more creative than ideas that were not congruent with norm. This confirms the point that the 
perception of creativity is basically a social judgment (see Csikszentmihalyi, 1998) that 
depends on normative criteria (Amabile, 1996), in ways that are consistent with the operation 
of social identity processes.  
General Discussion 
Although creativity has for a long time been studied as a property that is intrinsic to 
objects, ideas or people, recent theorizing has suggested that it is more fruitfully studied as a 
social judgment (Amabile 1983) and, moreover, one that is socially constructed within a 
given social system (Csikszentmihalyi, 1998). In this paper, we used the social identity 
perspective (and, in particular, self-categorization theory) to develop a novel analysis of the 
processes by which creativity is recognized within social groups. The program of research 
outlined above has empirically explored a number of factors which, according to our 
approach, should be implicated in perceptions of creativity. 
The findings show that ideas are more likely to be seen as creative to the extent that 
(a) they are congruent with group norms (Study 1 and 2), but that this effect does not occur 
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when (b) personal identity of the perceiver is salient (Study 1). In this way, the findings 
indicate that the group processes underlying creativity judgments are not indiscriminate. 
Instead, these results suggest that the content of group norms establishes the boundaries 
within which objects are deemed to be creative or not. As long as an idea remains within the 
normative boundaries, it is likely to be taken seriously. Thus, it appears that in order to be 
perceived as creative an idea needs to fall within the range of these normative boundaries 
(i.e., the group’s ‘latitude of acceptance’; Sherif & Sherif, 1969). The narrower the latitude of 
acceptance, the more likely it is that a deviant idea will be rejected and that a normative idea 
will be considered creative. The results therefore suggest that conformity and creativity are 
not always as incongruent as they may at first seem.  
It is important to note that, in Study 1, what allowed a seemingly non-novel idea to be 
considered creative was the interaction between social identity salience and the group norm. 
Thus we concluded that it is not simply the content of the prevalent social norm (or by 
implication, the current culture, fashion, or zeitgeist) which drives creativity and its 
perception. For, importantly, it was only among the participants who were induced to 
categorise themselves as members of a particular group that the group norm had an influence 
on creativity judgments. This finding qualifies existing arguments about perceived creativity 
which suggest that this is solely dictated by the norms and values that exist at a particular 
point in time (e.g., Martindale, 1990). 
Of course all this does not mean that the intrinsic properties of a product or an idea 
are irrelevant to, or play no role in, creativity. However, it is important to note that these 
intrinsic properties are not located in a social vacuum but are always perceived within a 
particular social context. In the absence of any concrete physical criteria for determining 
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what might constitute a creative object, social reality testing is the only way of establishing 
whether a product is creative or not, and this inevitably implies that creativity has to be 
consensually determined (Festinger, 1950, 1954; Postmes, Haslam & Swaab, in press; 
Turner, 1991). This theoretical observation opens the door for the more detailed theoretical 
and empirical analysis than the present paper provides (but see Adarves-Yorno, Postmes & 
Haslam, 2005). 
Our findings also indicate that the perception of creativity is related to, but distinct 
from, other forms of positive evaluation. Put slightly differently, although the perception of 
creativity is undoubtedly a form of positive evaluation, there are conditions under which the 
two are driven by different underlying processes (Study 2). Thus, where positivity towards a 
proposal may be anchored in various social values, including preferences of a subgroup or of 
the person themselves, evaluation of the creativity value of the same proposal is more likely 
to be determined by assessment of the proposal relative to the social norms of the group that 
it has implications for.  
In addition to evaluation of ideas, Study 1 also explored evaluation of the creator. 
Results here suggested that when ideas were perceived to be most creative, people also had 
the greatest confidence in the leadership qualities of their originator (Study 1, H2). The 
enhanced endorsement of someone who fitted the group norm (when social identity was 
salient) suggests not only that social identity and self-categorization processes are implicated 
in judgments of creativity, but they could also determine people’s willingness to embrace 
particular courses of action (i.e., to be led in a particular direction).  
Moreover, the fact that social identity salience is so dependent on context implies that 
the boundaries imposed by group norms are never entirely fixed and rigid, and that there will 
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be many situations in which their violation will be sanctioned or tolerated. Indeed, in 
intragroup contexts the social demands to behave normatively are usually quite mild 
(Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005).  
It is thus typically when groups are engaged in some intergroup dynamic that 
normative behaviour becomes most important. In the Second World War, for example, 
creativity was rendered largely subservient to national objectives. This is illustrated by 
Hitler’s speech at the opening of the first German Art Exhibition in 1937 where he redefined 
creativity in wholly conservative terms, stating that: 
Until national socialism came to power, there was a so-called “modern” art in Germany, 
which was, as the term itself suggests, an art that changed almost every year. National 
Socialist Germany, however, wants to have a “German art” again, and like all creative 
virtues this art must and will be an eternal one (author’s translation). 
For Hitler and the Nazis, then, novelty was anything but a mark of creativity, it was a sign of 
degradation, a defilement of human nature. 
The social system that existed in Nazi Germany is of course rare, but despite its 
extremity it serves to underline the key point that even if acts of creativity appear, under 
“normal” conditions, to be only partially bound by social convention and norms of 
appropriateness, the processes by which their creativity is judged are highly sensitive to 
normative context and perceiver identity. 
Our research can also be seen to be related to the black sheep effect (e.g., 
Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002; 
Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988) in that it focuses on intragroup judgements in a 
normative context. However, there are three key aspects that differentiate our studies from 
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the classical black sheep study. First, research on creativity focuses much more on upgrading 
rather than derogating group members. Second, only ingroup products are evaluated. And 
third, the main focus of this research is on the perception of ideas, and although leadership 
evaluation has been included, once again, the dimensions to evaluate the leader were all 
positive.  
On the basis of our findings, we are now in a position to return to the question of how 
creativity should be conceptualized, and whether creativity is grounded in objective 
characteristics of the target of evaluation. Our results support Amabile’s (1983) argument for 
adopting a more subjective conceptualization: creativity is as much in the eye of the beholder 
as it is inferred from the novelty of the object. Indeed, the concept of novelty should itself 
come under scrutiny. On the face of it, it might appear to be a slightly easier task to establish 
what is novel rather than to establish what is creative. However, our research implies that any 
attempt to define novelty “objectively” is likely to end up in very much the same kind of 
epistemological miasma that surrounds questions of creativity. For this, again, is a debate in 
which the necessary outcome is a consensual social judgment (for a discussion see Wetherell, 
1987).  
Empirically too, the findings of Study 1 question directly the core assumption that 
novelty is an essential prerequisite for an idea to be seen as creative. Indeed, when a group 
identity was salient and that group’s norms were conservative, the idea of preserving existing 
structures was perceived as more creative. Indeed, this result potentially challenges the 
argument of Finke (1995) that creative and conservative ideas define two extremes of the 
same continuum. 
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However, one should not draw the conclusion from this that creativity is no more than 
conformity, and that the restrictions imposed by culture and norms inevitably curb creativity 
(Churchman, 1968; Tan, 1998). There is more to creativity than an audience or (sub-cultural) 
norm. However, at the same time, creativity is more than the property of a particular product 
or creator. Instead, then, creativity is constituted in the interaction between both these classes 
of factor: it is a dynamic social process in which individual and social-structural factors are 
both elementary.  
Implications of the social identity approach for understanding creativity  
One of the key strengths of applying the social identity approach to the analysis of 
creativity is that it does justice to what Csikszentmihalyi has identified as the key defining 
characteristic of creativity — that it is multiply determined by factors at individual and 
collective levels. Indeed, the social identity perspective approaches creativity from an 
antireductionist and interactionist point of view (Turner & Oakes, 1986). And although our 
research is primarily concerned with perceptions of creativity, we believe that the principles 
identified here should apply equally well to the production of creative output and the 
generation of innovative outcomes. In its genesis, as in its recognition, the creative product is 
likely to be shaped through the interaction of different factors at an individual and collective 
level, and in a context within which values and norms play a pivotal role in informing the 
direction of the creator’s activity (see Adarves-Yorno et al., 2005).  
More pragmatically, innovation and creativity are fundamental for the long-term 
survival of organizations (e.g., Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Tan, 1998), because they are the 
foundations of progress. Indeed, the terms creativity and innovation have often been used 
interchangeably (West & Farr, 1990). However, researchers nowadays agree that creativity 
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refers to processes of “idea generation” and innovation refers to the implementation of these 
ideas (Amabile, 1996). In organizational settings, the perception of creativity is therefore a 
prerequisite for innovation in the sense that ideas need to be perceived as creative in order to 
be considered worthy of implementation. Moreover, we believe that such organizational 
settings are precisely where the impact of group membership (e.g., as members of different 
departments; van Knippenberg & van Schie, 2000), group norms (e.g., the culture of the 
organization and norms of different departments; Ellemers, 2003) and social identification 
with the organization (Haslam , 2001; Haslam et al., 2003) will be most acutely felt, and 
where these factors will play a particularly important role in shaping innovation.  
Future Directions 
As suggested above, the same factors that impact on the perception of creativity 
may also inform creative behavior. Creativity is generally originated within groups: 
artists, writers and scientists often do their most creative work when collaborating with 
members of their group (Farrell, 2001). Likewise, the nature of their creations is usually 
shaped by the group to which they belong (e.g., creative impressionist painters adhered to 
the artistic rules of impressionism in their paintings). We believe that future research on 
creativity should consider more explicitly the wider social context within which creativity 
is manifested. It follows from our analysis that issues of identity are intimately related to 
both social judgment and group behavior. In this regard, it is important to note that recent 
work in the social identity approach has revived one of Tajfel’s (1978) original concerns, 
namely that identity is not merely about being but also about becoming (Reicher, 2001), 
not merely about identity achievement but also about identity change (Turner, Pratkanis 
& Samuels, 2003). It strikes us that this conceptualization of social identity as both the 
 31
vehicle and the locus for social change is likely to prove particularly fruitful in future 
study of innovation and of the processes whereby creative solutions and novel practices 
are embraced. 
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Footnotes 
1. It is important to note here that the reliance on personal (or subgroup) values is 
not inconsistent with the social identity approach—from various angles, recent research 
has suggested that people are actively engaged in influencing superordinate group norms 
according to personal and subgroup agenda's (e.g., Postmes et al., in press; Sani & 
Reicher, 2000; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004). Such processes are 
especially likely to occur when personal relevance is high, and when the subject being 
evaluated is one that affects concrete self-relevant outcomes. 
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Figure captions  
 
Figure 1. Perceptions of the creativity of a conservative idea as a function of identity salience 
and group norm. 
 
Figure 2. Perceptions of the leadership qualities of the proponent of conservative idea as a 
function of identity salience and group norm. 
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